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Abstract VoIP is one of the most popular Internet services.
However, VoIP service is vulnerable to several potential secu-
rity threats. Moreover, existing IP-based security solutions are
unable to inspect call setup information. In this paper, we
propose a VoIP-aware attack-detection scheme. The proposed
scheme is able to detect VoIP network attacks including VoIP
DoS and SPAM. It can detect VoIP DoS attacks with low false
negatives using a statistics-based detection algorithm and can
recognize SPAM with low false positives using a caller
behavior-based detection algorithm. We have included exper-
imental results to confirm the proposed scheme.
Keywords VoIP .SIP .VoIPDoS .SPAM .Attackdetection .
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1 Introduction
The early residential Internet used DSL (Digital Subscriber
Line) through PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network)
for sending e-mail and browsing web pages. Nowadays, the
Internet infrastructure is installed ubiquitously and can be
accessed in the street or on public transportation. Furthermore,
mobile Internet services are available with wireless commu-
nication technologies such as WLAN (Wireless LAN) and
LTE (Long Term Evolution).
VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) service is one of the
most universally popular services. Using the existing IP (In-
ternet Protocol) infrastructure for voice and video communi-
cation, it is replacing PSTN. Because of the low cost of the
VoIP service, users install VoIP Apps on smart phones.
However, the VoIP service has many security vulnerabil-
ities such as DoS (Denial of Service), VoIP SPAM, and
eavesdropping. It inherits every threat from the IP network
and includes new threats from its protocols including SIP
(Session Initiation Protocol) and H.323. PSTN has a closed
network architecture and provides communication using
physical line switching. Therefore, the attacker must have a
knowledge of the professional PSTN signal process to access
the traffic. However, the IP network is open to any Internet
user. Consequently, it is less difficult to access VoIP systems
such as proxy servers, IP-PBXs (Private Branch Exchange),
and IP-phones. The telephone is a real-time service and VoIP
is a natural technology to compete with PSTN. However, VoIP
must provide PSTN-level security to ensure continued VoIP
popularity growth.
In this paper, we focus on two attack methods in the VoIP
network. The first is the DoS attack [1] initiated by sending
numerous INVITE packets or malformed messages in a short
period to designated targets. DoS attacks are already common
in other IP services. VoIP uses a unique routing algorithm
utilizing a proxy server, SBC (Session Border Controller), and
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IP-PBX; it has several methods such as OPTIONS, INVITE,
and REGISTER for telephony communication. Therefore,
VoIP-DoS attacks are difficult to detect and mitigate with the
existing IP-based security solutions such as firewalls and IPSs
(Intrusion Prevention System). The second attack method is
VoIP SPAM. Attackers send vast quantities of VoIP SPAM
using automated machine processes. In this paper, we describe
these attack methods and propose a detection system. Exper-
imental results are included to confirm the proposed scheme.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the
characteristics of an SIP-basedVoIP service and consequential
security threats are addressed. In Section 3, we propose a
novel detection and mitigation scheme to address VoIP net-
work attacks and a system structure based on statistics and call
behavior. In Section 4, we evaluate the proposed scheme with
experimental results. We conclude this paper in Section 5.
2 Related works
2.1 SIP-based VoIP
Existing security solutions use 5-tuple information (source IP,
source port, destination IP, destination port, protocol (TCP,
UDP, ICMP)) from the IP traffic to analyze and detect abnor-
malities. The VoIP application service is based on the SIP
(Session Initiation Protocol) protocol [2]. This uses an addi-
tional user identifier, URI (Unique Resource Identifier) and
the pattern of the traffic is dependent upon the URI informa-
tion. The URI is a telephone number in PSTN and e-mail
address in an E-mail service. However, existing security solu-
tions are not able to capture the URI correctly making the
precise analysis of SIP traffic patterns and detection of VoIP
abnormalities difficult.
The VoIP service uses a proxy server and URI-based
routing algorithm on its overlay network. Call establishment
traffic is sent first to the proxy server. The proxy server
acquires the corresponding real-IP address from the registra-
tion database and forwards the SIP packets to the destination.
During this process, the IP information of the IP header is
changed at each node. With only the IP and port information
from the IP header packet, it is impossible to notify the final
destination of the traffic.
As explained above, the VoIP call establishment traffic passes
through proxy servers. Figure 1 illustrates a simple example of
this process. There are three different sections of the VoIP traffic
transmission. They are the section between the callers and server,
between servers, and between server and recipients.
The VoIP traffic in each section can be characterized as
follows:
1. Section 1: destination IP address is fixed to SIP proxy
server;
2. Section 2: source and destination IP addresses are fixed to
SIP proxy server;
3. Section 3: source IP address is fixed to SIP proxy server.
Because of these characteristics, the traffic pattern of one user
can be analyzed differently depending upon the capture point.
The abnormal pattern of SIP traffic can be characterized by
the type of the transmitted messages. A VoIP session is
established by a VoIP request transaction and response mes-
sages such as INVITE, 200 OK, and ACK. In a normal call
condition, the ratio of VoIP messages is maintained as a
designated value. For example, the REGISTER method is
generally the most frequently sent method. The ratio of IN-
VITE and BYE is almost the same. However, in an abnormal
condition, the shape of the ratio is different. Figure 2 is a
simple INVITE flooding attack. In this attack, the attacker
overwhelms the proxy server with numerous INVITE mes-
sages in a short period, and the ratio of INVITE messages
increases instantly.
2.2 Network attacks of VoIP
As we defined in the Introduction, VoIP network attacks are
caused by abnormal VoIP traffic. In this paper, we focus on
VoIP DoS and SPAM attacks.
The methodology of a VoIP DoS attack is the same as an
existing IP-based DoS attack. The attacker directs numerous
VoIP messages to the VoIP proxy server of the VoIP phone.
This leads to a deterioration of service quality, and can some-
times incapacitate the service. In the case of VoIP service, a
DoS attack interrupts the entire Internet service or normal
operation of the target VoIP service.
VoIP application DoS attacks can be classified into three
categories. These are invite flooding, registration flooding,
and RTP (Realtime Transportation Protocol [3]) flooding.
Invite-flooding and registration-flooding attacks are similar
to TCP SYN flood attacks on the IP network. A registration-
flood attack exhausts the resources of the VoIP proxy server or
registrar system by sending a vast number of registration
packets to request a connection. An RTP-flooding attack is an
attack using voice or media-related RTP packets that are modi-
fied at the RTP header and payload level by the attacker. In all
three cases, the attacker sends numerous modified VoIP packets
to the victim proxy server or VoIP phone software to increase
the call execution time and degrade the quality of the call.
SPAM attacks [4, 5] are classified into two categories, one-
ring SPAMwhere the attacker cancels the call before the target
answers and induces the target to return the call to the attacker,
and SPAM using automatic call systems where the attacker
calls random numbers and if the call is established delivers
pre-recorded commercial messages. In the former case, one
user attempts to call many phone numbers in a short time and
the possibility of call establishment is low. If a call is
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established, there would still be no RTP media traffic trans-
mission between the attacker and the target. Furthermore, one
caller can send many INVITE messages at the same time (in
normal conditions, this is impossible). In the latter situation,
call frequency is typically lower than one-ring SPAM; how-
ever, it is still more frequent than a normal user’s call pattern
and the establishment ratio will be lower. The majority of the
targets receiving a SPAM call terminate the call quickly. Thus,
the call duration will be short.
There is one additional type of SPAM that can be executed.
However, it is difficult to determine a factor to distinguish it
from a normal call using traffic pattern analysis. There are
companies that execute telephone marketing legally. To dif-
ferentiate this kind of SPAM call, the recipient must listen to
the message. We do not consider this option in this paper.
2.3 Previous work
Kim et al. proposed a scheme to detect VoIP SPAM traffic
based on caller behavior [5]. It uses seven factors for traffic
analysis, including Requests from Administrator, Call Rejec-
tion Rate, Number of Call Recipients, Call Duration, Call
Traffic, Call Rate, and Inter-Call Rate. As explained in Sec-
tion 2.2, SPAMers attempt to make phone calls to different
people in a short time and each call’s duration is brief. Each of
these factor checks if the traffic exhibits this pattern. For
example, the factor Call Rejection determines how many calls
were rejected by targets per 100 calls.
However, this scheme [5] has the potential to generate false
positives. The factors are derived based on a normal distribu-
tion. This implies that valid calls can be regarded as SPAM
calls. Specifically, it assigns weight to specified factors such as
Number of Call Recipients (50 %) and Call Duration (30 %).
These weights are excessively heavy. They do improve the
efficacy of the detecting function, however, numerous false
positive detections can occur. For SPAM detection, a high
false positive rate can be worse than a high false negative rate.
The aim of the detection process is to increase convenience,
not prevent service. For example, if a system allows one
SPAM call to be established, it is not a significant issue.
However, if a system blocks a valid call through miss-
detection, it could cause serious harm to the quality of service.
3 Proposed scheme and system
In this section, we describe the proposed scheme and system
structure. The objective is to detect and mitigate VoIP DoS and
SPAM attacks. VoIP service is an L7 application service.
Therefore, the existing L3-based detection scheme is not ac-
ceptable. The proposed scheme executes traffic analysis based
on VoIP L7 information. In the first phase, it detects VoIP DoS







Domain A Domain B
Fig. 1 VoIP traffic transmission
sections
Fig. 2 Example of INVITE
flooding DoS attack
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algorithm. In the second phase, it performs VoIP SPAM detec-
tion using a user call behavior-based detection algorithm.
The assumptions of the proposed scheme are as follow:
1. The proposed schememust detect andmitigate VoIP-aware
DoS and SPAM attacks and cannot consider existing L3-
based DoS and PSTN-based SPAM detection methods.
2. The proposed scheme is implemented as amodule of inline-
based IPS and functions with VoIP packets that are trans-
mitted to and from a VoIP server such as a proxy server.
3. If the VoIP packet is encrypted using an end-to-end en-
cryption algorithm, the system is unable to access the
traffic and an analysis is not possible.
3.1 Statistics-based VoIP DoS detection
The statistics-based DoS detection module of the proposed
scheme receives VoIP packets and inspects the L7 information
such as IP, URI, Call-ID, and Method. It analyzes the VoIP
traffic with this call-establishment information to identify
abnormal traffic. The threshold values are determined for each
detection rule. They are learned by a learning function for
each day and each hour and applied to the statistic-based DoS
detection module.
The structure of the module is uncomplicated. It compares
current VoIP traffic with VoIP-DoS detection rules. Figure 3
shows the features of a rule. Condition 1 is a grouping condi-
tion. A group that satisfies Condition 2 is a target of detection.
The proposed interval is 10 s (Table 1).
Themodule analyzes the number of packets having the same
IP, To URI, and Call-ID information. Generally, to establish one
call, a total of five messages are transmitted, such as “INVITE”,
“100 Trying”, “180 Ringing”, “200 OK”, and “ACK”. This is a
by-directional transmission. If the system captures only one
direction, this number will be less. Attackers generally use
INVITE or REGISTER messages for DoS attacks. These two
methods are sent only once at the beginning of a session. It is
impossible for a human to send several INVITE or REGISTER
messages per second. Conversely, attackers typically attempt to
send numerous INVITE or REGISTER packets at the same
time. To accomplish this, they use duplicated VoIP packets
without changing the Call-ID and URI.
The threshold values are updated at 00:00, 08:00, and
18:00 h. The maximum value for the interval becomes the
threshold. The module only uses normal traffic (traffic judged
as normal) for the study (Figs. 4 and 5).
3.2 Call behavior-based SPAM detection
User call behavior-based VoIP SPAM detection collects and
analyzes users’ past call patterns from a Caller Profiling DB to
detect VoIP SPAM. The proposed scheme uses five factors for
the detection. These factors are from the scheme of [5]. However,
to lower the false positive rate, we excluded normal distribution
in the calculation of Call Recipient and Call Duration. Only the
traffic that is pertinent to all the conditions can be judged as
SPAM traffic. The proposed scheme focuses on lowering the
false positive rate. The factors for detection are as follow.
& Call Recipient (CR)
1. Collecting info from most recent 30 (N) calls of each
caller
2. Acquiring call recipient info
3. Exclusion of duplicated call recipient (Core
Operation)
Fig. 3 Features of a rule
Table 1 Factors for VoIP DoS
detection Role Factor Description








Interval of detection interval DoS detection interval
Threshold threshold Threshold for DoS detection (learned by study function)
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4 . Der iv ing the number o f ca l l r ec ip i en t s
(CallRecipientNum)
5 . De r i v i n g c a l l r e c i p i e n t n umb e r R a t e
(CallRecipientRate)
CallRecipientRate ¼ CallRecipientNumN ð1Þ
& Call Duration (CD)
1. Collecting info from most recent 30 (N) calls of each
caller
2. Acquiring call duration info (Call End Time - Call
Start)
3. Excluding calls having longer Call Duration than
Threshold (Core Operation)
4. Deriving the number of short length Calls
(CallDurationNumShort)
5. Deriving Call Duration Rate (CallDurationRate)
CallDurationRate ¼ CallDurationNum ShortN ð2Þ
& Call Rejection Rate (CRR)
1. Collecting info from most recent 30 (N) calls of
each caller
2. Acquiring call rejection info
3. Counting corresponding Caller Rejections
(CallRejNum)
4. Deriving normal distribution of total caller call rejec-
tion count (using CR Mean and CR Std. Dev.)
5. Deriving the position of corresponding caller call















& Inter-Call Time (ICT)
1. Collecting info from most recent 30 (N) calls of each
caller
2. Acquiring Inter-Call Time info (Current Call Start
Time - Previous Call End Time)
Fig. 4 Methodology to learn threshold
Fig. 5 Flow chart of VoIP DoS
detection
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3. Deriving average of Inter-Call Time (ICTAVG) (Core
Operation)
4. Deriving normal distribution of total caller Inter-Call
Time (Using ICTMean and ICTStdDev)
5. Deriving the position of corresponding caller













& Call Rate (CRa)
1. Collecting info from most recent 30 (N) calls of each
caller
2. Deriving the range of time of corresponding caller’s
recent 100 calls
3. Deriving average of CallRate (CRAVG) (Core
Operation)
4. Deriving normal distribution of total caller Call Rate
(using CRMean and CRStdDev) (Fig. 6)
5. Deriving the position of corresponding caller













The objective of the scheme is to exclude normal distribu-
tion and apply a strong condition for detection. It is designed
to perform the SPAM detection process with few false
positives.
Processing/Applying





































VoIP Phones (6710~6750) VoIP Phones (6751~6789)Fig. 7 Diagram of the testbed
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3.3 System implementation
The proposed scheme is implemented as follows.
The received SIP traffic is first analyzed by the statistics-based
DoS detection module. The module determines if the traffic has
an abnormal VoIP DoS traffic pattern. If the traffic is judged
abnormal, the module alerts the administrator and drops the
corresponding packets. If it is judged normal, the information is
sent to the learning module to be learned and to derive a new
threshold. The proposed system then uses the behavior-based
SPAM detection module for the second step of the detection.
This module includes a function to detect a VoIP SPAM traffic
pattern based on each caller’s call behavior such as call frequency
and call duration. With these two modules, the proposed system
can detect VoIP DoS and SPAM traffic effectively.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Experimental testbed
To validate and evaluate the proposed system, we employed a
testbed consisting of a VoIP proxy server with 80 VoIP phones
and a VoIP attack emulator. The proposed scheme was imple-
mented on a system with a dual Intel E5130 CPU 2.0 GHz
dual-core processor and 4 GB memory. The process ran on a
Linux kernel 2.6.25.5.
To ensure reliable test data, we used the real-world VoIP
infrastructure of the Korea Internet & Security Agency. To
prevent a serious negative influence on the system, a VoIP
DoS attack using an enormous number of INVITE messages
was not attempted. Figure 7 is a diagram of the testbed.
The VoIP DoS attacks were generated with a VoIP threat
emulator, ThreatEX. It is able to generate specified VoIP
messages continuously. The user can modify the packet
source/destination IP, Call-ID, From/To URI, and Method
type. We executed a VoIP DoS attack with INVITE flooding
five times. Each attack was maintained for 60 s. Table 2 shows
the properties of the attacks.
To test the VoIP SPAM detection function, we emu-
lated SPAM calls by a human. We utilized a VoIP
phone numbered 6701 as an attacker. This phone
attempted to make SPAM calls to the other VoIP phones
numbered 6710 to 6789. We executed two attacks. First,
we attempted to emulate one-ring SPAM. We called 77
times to different recipients without an answer. Next, we
attempted to emulate SPAM using an automatic call
system. We called 63 times to different recipients, and
each recipient answered the call. The call duration was
10 s (Fig. 8).
4.2 Experimental results
Table 3 presents the result of the VoIP DoS prevention test.
The detection rate was derived using Detection/TAC * 100.
As shown, the proposed system detected essentially every
Table 2 VoIP DoS generation
Step Destination To Method Pkts/s
1 Proxy server 6711(fix) INVITE 100
2 Proxy server 6711(fix) INVITE 200
3 Proxy server 6711(fix) INVITE 300
4 Proxy server 6711(fix) INVITE 400
5 Proxy server 6711(fix) INVITE 500
96% 96% 96% 97%








100 200 300 400 500
pkts/sec
(%)
Detection rate Detection rate(with Malformed Filter)
Block rate Block rate (with Malformed Filter)
Fig. 8 Result of VoIP DoS test
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DoS packet regardless of the transmitted packets per second
rate. There were a minimal number of false positives. Verify-
ing the raw packets indicated that there were some VoIP
packets with poorly formatted information. Some of the attack
packets contained invalid data and others did not contain a
valid URI field.
Consequently, we re-tested the system with an addi-
tional module, a malformed-packet filter. This module is
included in the proposed system. Because it does not
have a direct relationship to the DoS and SPAM detec-
tion, we have not described the details of this function
in this paper. Table 4 displays the result of the VoIP
DoS prevention test using the malformed-packet filter.
For all the tests, the proposed system detected 100 %
of the malicious VoIP packets and the block rate in-
creased. Some of attack packets were not blocked.
Blocking is executed after the detection and until to
detect the attack it has to pass some packets, even
though they are malicious, because it has to collect
packets for 10 s to judge if the traffic has a pattern of
attacks or not.
The proposed system detected 88.3 % of one-ring
SPAM calls and 90 % of automatic call system SPAM
calls in the second test. It recorded only a 0.16 % false
positive rate. The false positive rate is derived using
Eq. (6),
FalsePositive rate ¼ FalsePositive
EntireCalls
 100 ð6Þ
* False Positive indicates the number of valid calls judged
to be SPAM.
The proposed system erroneously detected only five
calls out of 3,150 normal calls. We expect that as the
size of the dataset increases, there will be additional
detail information for detection, and the false positive
rate will decrease (Table 5).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed novel schemes to detect
VoIP network attacks such as VoIP DoS and SPAM.
Our contribution increased the efficacy of VoIP detec-
tion using a statistical learning-based VoIP DoS detec-
tion scheme and decreased the false positive rate of
SPAM detection using enhanced analysis factors and
strong conditions.
The proposed scheme can be implemented as a module of
inline-based IPS systems and can work as a practical VoIP-
aware network security solution. We confirmed the efficacy of
the proposed system with experimental results.
Our future work is to improve the SPAM detection scheme
and increase the detection rate to over 95 %. We may also
prepare a more detailed and extensive dataset for the next
experiment.
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